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Europe: Vanishing Mediator?1
Being invited by the Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin to give this
year’s first public George L. Mosse Lecture is one of the greatest
honors that I have received.2 It is also for me a moving opportu-
nity to return to Berlin and meet dear friends and excellent col-
leagues. Finally, it gives me the possibility to present before you
some hypotheses on the function that European intellectuals can
perform and the ideas that they should advocate in the current in-
ternational situation, where the very project of a European com-
munity of nations and citizens is challenged. For all these gener-
ous gifts I want to thank you very sincerely.
I am especially pleased to speak under the auspices of George
Mosse. I became aware of the importance of his work rather late
in my life. Since reading Nationalism and Sexuality and his other
books dealing with the relationships between nationalism, race,
gender, and sexuality in the building of modern communities, I
have always considered him a master of historical and political
anthropology. I have also realized the extent to which his life and
career, marked by the consequences of the European catastrophe
of the twentieth century, and shared among the universities of
three continents, form an epitome of our cosmopolitan back-
ground and a key to the intelligence of our present. I draw a per-
manent inspiration from them.
I. Voices from America
Since September 11, many calls are directed toward Europeans.
This is flattering for us, but also embarrassing. We understand
that we really exist, but we fear some misunderstanding. I shall
concentrate on the calls coming from the United States. Leaving
9aside for the moment the official (or quasi-official) ones which
express the view of the current Administration, I will examine in
more detail those coming from the liberal intellectuals of Amer-
ica. This call is indeed self-critical; it is voiced by a „minority“
that wants to distinguish itself from the „majority“, criticizing the
choices that are imposed by the majority and their elected repre-
sentatives. The underlying idea is that in a globalized world no
power can „save“ itself alone, but that it could very well „doom“
itself and the others. I shall recall some of the voices from Amer-
ica.
My first example is Bruce Ackerman. In February 2002, the
prominent jurist and political philosopher from Yale published
an article in The London Review of Books with the title „Don’t
Panic“. Ackerman begins with the idea that „the attack of 11 Sep-
tember is the prototype of similar events that will litter the 21st
century“, and that „if American reaction is any guide, we urgent-
ly require new constitutional concepts to deal with the protection
of civil liberties“. Otherwise, he prophecies, „a downward cycle
threatens […]. Even if the next half-century sees only four or five
attacks on the scale of 11 September, this destructive cycle will
prove devastating to civil liberties by 2050“. However, he does
not see „an absolutist defense of traditional freedom“ as the right
response on the part of liberals. Declaring his concern to „pre-
vent politicians from exploiting momentary panic to impose
long-lasting limitations on liberty“, Ackerman is especially crit-
ical of the notion of „war on terrorism“, which can and will be
used both to cancel civil liberties and to destroy the democratic
balance of powers between the administration, Congress, and the
judiciary. What he advocates is a carefully controlled „state of
emergency“ with legal and temporal limits, where as many „nor-
mal“ institutions as possible keep working under internal and ex-
ternal scrutiny of the „defenders of freedom“. And he concludes:
„In the future, it will not be enough to defeat proposals that
threaten permanent damage to civil liberties. A framework law
emerging from any major European state would have worldwide
influence. It would help us see the ‚war on terrorism‘ for what it
is: an extravagant metaphor blocking responsible thought about
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a serious problem.“3 Even if you take into account that this was
written for a European journal, it remains surprising and striking.
The appeal seems to imply that certain traditions rooted in Euro-
pean politics form a legal pole of resistance against the tenden-
cies towards the militarization of politics, inside and outside
America, that threatens the very values in whose name the „war
on terrorism“ is declared and fought.
I want to take my second example from a very different author
and context. In a public lecture delivered in December 2002, the
Marxist historian and social scientist Immanuel Wallerstein, Di-
rector of the Fernand Braudel Center at the State University of
New York at Binghamton, explained how he saw the prospects
of relationships between the United States and the world after the
revelation of a completely new situation that the destruction of
the twin towers had represented for Americans.4 In the first part
of his talk, he reminds us that the United States „had always de-
fined itself by the yardstick of the world“, which seemed to prove
its continuous superiority. He goes on quoting from Osama bin
Laden’s presentation of America as a „depraved“ country, show-
ing that bin Laden was the first person in history to become able
to translate very widespread anti-American feelings into a phys-
ical attack initiated on American soil that left it momentarily
helpless. As a consequence, a „war on terrorism“ was declared,
with „no reservations“, that is, including measures against inter-
nal enemies. Wallerstein discusses the vulnerabilities of Ameri-
can hegemony, by comparing it with previous examples in histo-
ry. Wallerstein’s thesis is that the hegemony of the United States
is no longer based on unchallenged economic superiority, but on-
ly on military capacity. He describes the successive strategies
that were implemented after World War II to eliminate forces
and powers considered adversary to American interests in the
world: containment, neutralization, interventions, subversion,
selective „anti-proliferation“ military policies.
In the end, Wallerstein distinguishes between the belief that
„America and Americans are the cause of all the world’s miseries
and injustices“, which he denies, and the belief that „they are
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their prime beneficiaries“, which he endorses. He expresses his
fear that America, while trying to „rebuild“ the power that the
Twin Towers symbolized, might sacrifice the ideals of freedom
and universality that went along with the traditional privileges.
This is where a reference to Europe (among others) surfaces
again:
„What the United States needs now to do is to learn how to
live with the new reality – that it no longer has the power
to decide unilaterally what is good for everyone. [...] It has
to come to terms with the world. It is not Osama bin Laden
with whom we must conduct a dialogue. We must start
with our near friends and allies – with Canada and Mexico,
with Europe, with Japan. And once we have trained our-
selves to hear them and to believe that they too have ideals
and interests, that they too have hopes and aspirations, then
and only then perhaps shall we be ready to dialogue with
the rest of the world, that is, with the majority of the
world.“
I understand Wallerstein’s position as expressing a neo-univer-
salist perspective. It takes the form of a defense of multilateral-
ism against the attempt to recreate the conditions of a past eco-
nomic hegemony through the implementation of a military
superiority that remains unchallenged at its own level, but is en-
tirely vulnerable to the new kind of threat that develops within
the limits of the dominant system. It should be a permanent con-
cern, therefore, to resist the polarization of the world into the mi-
metic figures of Leviathan (the world-monopoly of „legitimate“
violence) and Behemoth (the ubiquitous power of subversion
based on „fundamentalist“ religious creeds).
I borrow my third example from the article published in The New
York Times April 2002 by the British historian and expert on
Eastern European Affairs, Timothy Garton Ash (who teaches in
Oxford but also works at the Hoover Institution at Stanford Uni-
versity), with the unambiguous title: „The Peril of Too Much
Power.“5 This is also a voice „from America“. Professor Ash be-
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gins by stating that „for most of the 20th century, the defining po-
litical question was: What do you think of Russia? At the begin-
ning of the 21st century, it is: What do you think of America?“
He recalls how „America is part of everyone’s imaginative life,
through movies, music, television and the Web, whether you
grow up in Bilbao, Beijing or Bombay. Everyone has a New
York in their heads, even if they have never been there.“ In a
sense it is not the existence of an American culture that is doubt-
ful, but rather that of a European one. But then comes the prob-
lem of the use of America’s power and the effects of the enor-
mous imbalance of power in the world.: „When a nation has so
much power, what it doesn’t do is as fateful as what it does.“ Pro-
fessor Ash especially fears the consequences of a possible Amer-
ican war in Iraq, without any simultaneous initiative to negotiate
a settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which would unite
the Islamic world against the West while dividing Europe from
America, „with disastrous consequences for years to come.“ Fi-
nally he explains that, since „contrary to what many Europeans
think, the problem with American power is not that it is Ameri-
can“, but that it is unchecked. The internal democratic controls
are no longer sufficient or working. „International agencies,
starting with the United Nations, and transnational nongovern-
mental organizations are a place to start. My answer is Europe –
Europe as an economic equal to the United States and Europe as
a close-knit group of states with a long diplomatic and military
experience.“ A difficulty remains, however: „the gulf between its
military capacity and that of the U.S. grows ever wider“. Europe-
ans therefore face a „complicated double task“: „to strengthen
[their] capacity to act outside [their] own borders while disentan-
gling the idea of a stronger Europe from its sticky anti-American
integument“.
Finally, I want to quote from a recent article by Edward Said:
„Europe versus America.“6 Reporting from England, where he is
currently teaching, Said emphasizes cultural differences between
the U.S. and Europe, especially the disproportionate power of re-
ligious fundamentalism: „religion and ideology play a far greater
role in the former than in the latter. [...] The vast number of
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Christian fanatics in the US [...] form the core of George Bush’s
support and at 60 million strong represent the single most pow-
erful voting block in US history“. This American fundamental-
ism has merged with the conservative ideology of „American
Values“ developed during the Cold War and has become „a men-
ace to the world“. It produces the „unilateralist“ external policy,
the belief that the U.S. as an „elect nation“ has a divine mission
to be fulfilled by all means. Said embarks then on a synthetic
comparison of the ideologies and the political systems on both
sides of the Atlantic: „There is no trace of this sort of thing in Eu-
rope that I can detect. Nor is there that lethal combination of
money and power on a vast scale that controls elections and na-
tional policy at will.“ For Said, Europe remains more democratic
in practice, the citizens have more effective control over the pol-
iticians, are less exposed to ideological blackmail when they dis-
sent from the official policy, and have a less Manichean view of
the world. „No wonder then that America has never had an or-
ganized Left or real opposition party as has been the case in every
European country.“
II. Contradictions and Illusions
We certainly cannot ignore this call coming from the intellectu-
als of America. It really touches our common interests. We may
observe that all these texts have a certain „family resemblance“.
But we suspect that they include deep contradictions, and we fear
that they have substituted an imaginary Europe for the real one.
Obviously, some American liberals share the view that America
is the model democracy, they are especially concerned with the
future of democracy in America, which they think should be an
interest of the whole world, while others – from a more „global“
or „systemic“ point of view – believe that the democratic charac-
ter of the U.S. will itself entirely depend on the way America be-
haves towards the rest of the world. Even more striking are the
diverse ways in which these voices refer to the great divides of
the world after the Cold War. But what I find even more striking
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is the latent tension between two opposite ways of formulating
the call to Europe: either as a demand for a check and balance, in
order to countervail the American (super)power, or a demand for
mediation within the „war of civilizations“ that America is now
apparently waging. If you choose the first formulation, you are in
a „strategic“ logic, where the relationships of forces ultimately
resolve into military terms, quantitatively and qualitatively. Why
address Europe in this case rather than, say, Russia, Japan, or
China? Perhaps because the authors of these texts more or less
transfer onto Europe the ideal model of „force merged with
right“ that they fear America has now betrayed. If you choose the
second formulation, you are in a logic of „moral“ and „social“ in-
fluences, which certainly does not ignore relationships of forces,
but sees them as only one aspect of a more comprehensive proc-
ess of cultural transformation. In that case, the apparently irre-
versible gap in military power between the United States and Eu-
rope is not necessarily a handicap for Europe. But the question
whether it really displays an alternative to American policy be-
comes more embarrassing. Clearly, „multilateralism“ does not
mean exactly the same thing from these two points of view. The
first is compatible with a confrontation between rival „isolation-
isms“. Whereas the second implies that political isolation today,
among allies or even adversaries, has become obsolete and im-
possible to achieve. Rather than a „right of intervention“, what
we are confronted with would be a „fact of intervention“, that is,
interdependence: we cannot ignore it, only perhaps organize it
and modify its consequences.
One may wonder, whence the European rejection of the use of
force as a means to solve international conflicts originates? This
is not, according to Robert Kagan’s analysis, which has received
considerable attention on both sides of the Atlantic, because Eu-
ropeans possess a special character or moral nature: in past cen-
turies, when they dominated the world, they never tired of using
force to increase or keep their power, and quite simply they no
longer have the capacities for power politics. Europe and Amer-
ica have „exchanged“ their political cultures, as it were: it is now
Europe that has adopted the Wilsonian discourse, dreaming of
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„civilizing the world“ by putting an end to the wars and doing
away with Machtpolitik, whose terrible effects Europeans have
lived on their own soil. A nice project indeed ... with one proviso:
what makes European pacifism and moral consciousness materi-
ally possible is American military power itself! The irony is that
this transatlantic disagreement is the fruit of successful transat-
lantic policies. As Joschka Fischer and other Europeans admit,
the United States made the new Europe possible by leading the
democracies to victory in World War II and the Cold War and by
providing the solution to the age-old ‚German problem‘. Even to-
day, Europe’s rejection of power politics ultimately depends on
America’s willingness to use force around the world against
those who still do believe in power politics. Europe’s Kantian or-
der depends on the United States using power according to the
old Hobbesian rules. Most Europeans do not realize that they can
project themselves into „post-history“ or „post-modern history“
only because the U.S. did not follow this path. But as a result
„this has put Europeans and Americans on a collision course.“
Formally speaking, they remain allies, but the former see the lat-
ter as a „rogue colossus“, and the latter see the former as a virtual
obstacle, if not a potential traitor. Perhaps it would be better to
acknowledge this contradiction, rather than desperately trying to
fill the cultural gap.
I don’t believe that I distort the meaning of Robert Kagan’s
analysis7 if I say in a nutshell: the „European“ position, express-
ing something like a religion of law, is at the same time power-
less („Europe? how many divisions?“, we might ask, echoing a
famous question raised by Stalin), and illegitimate (since it dis-
guises a historical regression as moral progress, misrepresenting
its real weakness as an imaginary strength). Finally it is self-de-
structive: it undermines the defensive capacities of the Western
democracies, everywhere under attack in the world, which re-
main its only safety. It is decidedly not America that has „too
much power“, it is Europe that has too little. A double question
is at stake here. There is a first question concerning the „power“
of Europe. In a sense, Europe as a sum is even less powerful than
some of its constitutive nation-states, or its power is less effec-
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tive, more difficult to implement. There is also a second question
concerning the „political capacity“ of Europe in today’s world,
in particular its capacity to help resolve conflicts and hence the
concept of the political by which this capacity can be measured.
Here is the position that I want now to develop: undoubtedly,
from a certain point of view, Europe does not exist, it is not a po-
litical „subject“. And in this sense to ask Europe to disturb the
ongoing processes and plans, to „check and balance“ other pow-
ers, is a pure illusion. But on the other hand you cannot reduce
the idea of „mediation“ to the alternative of power politics (ulti-
mately relying upon military force) and „moral“ powerlessness,
even if you admit that a diplomatic and institutional expression
has to be found for such a mediation at some moment. The ques-
tion then becomes: how to imagine a change in the relationship
between „politics“ and „power“, or perhaps better, in the very
notion of „power“.
I agree that European political capacity, which is a necessary
condition of its autonomy, in a sense simply does not exist. „Eco-
nomic weight“ is a weak argument, especially in a globalized
economy. Even if you crown it with a common currency, it rep-
resents only a variable statistical aggregate, precisely so long as
no corresponding „strategy“ or „economic policy“ exists. If you
reflect further on the recent confrontation at the United Nations
Security Council about the right of the United States to launch
what it called a „preventive war“ against Iraq, you see clearly
that it is not „Europe“ that, to some extent, has checked Ameri-
can power. It is a conjunctural convergence of middle-range
powers who refused to become completely „marginalized“ in in-
ternational relations. They are not all of Europe, and not all of
them are European. In addition, they wouldn’t have achieved an-
ything without certain internal divisions within American strate-
gy itself.
Above all, there is a strong case to be made for Europe’s incapac-
ity to solve its own problems without American „help“. When I
say its „own“ problems, I am also thinking of neighboring prob-
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lems where Europe is necessarily involved. This is exactly the
opposite of the liberal dream, but there are numerous dramatic
and recent examples, of which we can list but a few. Europe re-
mains unable to solve the Irish problem, where two of its old na-
tions are involved, each with its own „diaspora.“ It proved unable
to prevent the civil war in Yugoslavia, which produced the worst
crimes against humanity since Nazism, whether by offering a
framework for development and coexistence to the various Bal-
kan communities, or by launching a military intervention to neu-
tralize the agressors and protect the populations with some
chance of success. The U.S. then has good reasons to explain
that, beginning with the two World Wars, it has been American
intervention that has stopped bloodshed and opposed savagery
on European soil. What seems to be a characteristic of the twen-
tieth century, and could characterize the twenty-first as well, is
not a „European mediation“ in conflicts involving America, but
rather an „American mediation“ in conflicts that rend Europe and
prove that it is unable to provide an effective political expression
for the historical and moral identity it claims to represent.
This is equally true concerning the way Europe deals with violent
situations that have developed at its „borders“. Algeria, Pales-
tine-Israel, Chechnya: these are the names of a long series of
shameful collective resignations of Europe. Each time in differ-
ent ways, tracing back to colonial history, to its own ethnic and
religious divisions, its wars and genocides, Europe was involved
as a cause or a mirror of these „impossible to solve“ conflicts,
whose continuous degradation threatens its own civility and mor-
al identity. History seems to show that any political entity, in or-
der to exist, needs an „idea“ or a universal project to unify its hu-
man and material forces. But Europe’s project can no longer be
to subjugate the world, as in the colonial era. Nor can it be a mes-
sianic project of announcing the birth of the „new man“. Europe
can indeed try to exercise a „civilizing“ influence in the world,
as well as to build the moral conditions of its own construction,
but in order to do so it has to be more active. By abandoning the
Chechens to the total war waged against them by post-soviet
Russia, Europe keeps in the traditional line of blindness before
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genocidal processes, and it practically denies the „European“
character of Russia, destroying the possibilities of finally lifting
the „iron curtain“. By practically endorsing the plans of the U.S.-
Israel alliance in the Middle East, the Europeans help the devel-
opment of a new „generalized“ anti-Semitism in the world,
where judeophobia and arabophobia paradoxically merge. By
keeping silent on the crimes of the Algerian army (which seem
to match the crimes of the Islamic terrorist groups) and backing
the repression of democratic movements by other authoritarian
regimes in Northern Africa, while at the same time racially and
culturally discriminating against their own „immigrant“ popula-
tions from the Maghreb, they provoke a disastrous collapse of the
„Euro-Mediterranean“ project.
But, we may ask, is this the only way to analyze the situation? I
would suggest that the new „global“ conjuncture offers other al-
ternatives. Undoubtedly the cultural divisions and conflicting in-
terests of the world also affect us in Europe and could become
acute. There is to date no strong symbol of a common identity
that could help neutralize or suppress them. Undoubtedly Europe
and America are not separated spaces, any more than Europe and
Eurasia, or Europe and the Middle East. In this respect some
countries owe to their history or their geography or their demo-
graphic composition the virtual capacity to „open gates“ and
„build bridges“. Whether you think of Britain, the Ukraine, Tur-
key, or the Balkans, it would be absurd to try and forcefully lo-
cate them on a single side of an external „European border“. Un-
doubtedly Europe does not have the capacity to impose a kind of
European „Monroe Doctrine“. But you can read all this in the op-
posite sense. No European „identity“ can be opposed to others in
the world because there exist no absolute borderlines between
the historical and cultural territory of Europe and the surrounding
spaces. There exist no absolute borderlines because Europe as
such is a „borderline“. More precisely it is a superposition of
borderlines, hence a superposition of heterogeneous relations to
the other histories and cultures of the world, which are repro-
duced within its own history and culture established rules.
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We must draw all the consequences from the fact that Europe is
a borderland rather than an entity that „has“ borders (or „will
have“ them in the future). This quite naturally leads us to com-
pletely reexamine the relationships between „strategy“, „power“,
and „subjectivity“ . In order to overcome the dilemma of a strat-
egy that presupposes the autonomy of the subject that conceives
and implements it, agency must have a privilege over identity.
What is at stake is indeed a complete change in the way relations
of power are calculated, imputed, and recognized on the world
scale.
III. Toward a European „Anti-Strategic“ Policy?
I am convinced that only a transformation in the way we under-
stand the concept of politics in relation with the idea of „power“
will allow us to begin to escape the aporias affecting the notion
of a „European policy“, and to give a realistic content to the no-
tion of a „European mediation“, which combines such opposite
demands as increasing Europe’s specific role in world affairs,
and deconstructing the myths of European closure and exclusive
identity. How then both to individualize and de-substantialize
Europe? Is that really possible?
It will become possible only if, reacting to the calls addressed to
us and drawing lessons from historical experience, we criticize to
the roots the proposition presupposed by most of the arguments
concerning politics and power: that an efficient action can take
place only when the agent has an exclusive control over some re-
sources, and is able to use them as a unified „sovereign subject“,
at the very least enjoying a stable and recognized identity. This
was typically the objective of the classical nation-states, and the
European Union seems to be in permanent search of similar con-
stitutional and administrative tools to achieve the same result.
What I suggest is that we need to explore a completely different
path, where power does not predate action, but is rather its re-
sult, in a sense that depends upon the goals that one wants to
achieve. It is action, or agency, that produces the degree and dis-
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tribution of power, not the reverse. As Michel Foucault used to
explain, agency is „power acting upon power“, therefore it is the
(efficient) use of the other’s power, also resulting from its own
orientation.9 For the same reason, a „collective identity“ is not a
given, a metaphysical prerequisite of agency, and it is certainly
not a mythical image that could be forcefully imposed upon real-
ity by inventing this or that historical criterion (for example,
„Christian Europe“). It is a quality of collective agency, which
changes form and content in time, as new agents come into play
and new solidarities are built among those who, not long ago,
were ignoring or fighting each other.
It will be useful to remind ourselves, in a schematic manner, of
historical experiences that contributed to shaping contemporary
Europe, especially in the past century. The lessons that we can
draw from them are clearly not beyond dispute; they can be in-
terpreted diversely in different places on the Continent and ac-
cording to the social and political affiliations of each of us. But
they have become to a large extent part of our collective memory,
which is active in our intellectual elaborations and the institu-
tional realities of Europe.
A first lesson – let us call it the lesson of tragedy, because it con-
cerns the „civil wars“ that devastated the European community
of peoples – seems initially to be purely negative. However, it
gives its deep roots to what I would call, following Monique
Chemillier-Gendreau, a „transnational public order“ that contra-
dicts the „Clausewitzian“ equivalence of the „means“ of war and
the „means“ of politics.10 Retrospectively, the interstate national
wars that periodically broke into the history of the „peoples“ and
modified their respective powers, leading in the end to the mass
exterminations during the World Wars and even after, are only
one aspect of a more general system of violent conflicts, which
includes also „wars“ between classes, religious communities,
ideologies. And it is far from easy to always clearly distinguish
what mainly depends on ethnic or religious, as opposed to social
and ideological determinations. Whenever you believe to be able
to reach a „final“ solution, you create the conditions for more de-
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struction and self-destruction. Mutual extermination as such
does not have an „end“ – or better said, it can reach an end only
when it is radically deprived of its legitimacy, and if collective
institutionalized counter-powers emerge.
But this is an incomplete lesson, and in some sense a blind one.
It takes the problem of violence within a „metropolitan“ frame-
work that cannot really be isolated. Only recently, and with con-
siderable difficulties, have we become conscious of the fact that
„barbarity“ indeed circulated for centuries between the dominant
center and the dominated periphery. The critical labor of memory
concerning the violence of European conquest and rule did not
immediately start with decolonization, but long after the event,
as in the case of the French War in Algeria. Much remains to be
uncovered and acknowledged, but this growing consciousness of
the realities of colonial history, a history that has made Europe
what it is, has now profoundly disturbed Eurocentric visions that
used to contrast „our“ civilization with „their“ barbarity: the
greatest barbarity certainly. The positive counterpart of all this is
a powerful, irreversible phenomenon of hybridization and multi-
culturalism now transforming Europe in a way that considerably
differs from the American „melting pot“, even if you consider
such „cosmopolitan“ cities as New York and Los Angeles. It
started with specific, reciprocal ties between former metropolis-
es and their former empires, but is now quite generalized as a pat-
tern of interaction between Europe as such and its „exterior“. If
the first lesson to be drawn from recent European history could
be called a tragic lesson of public order, we might call this other
one a lesson of otherness. It leads Europe to recognize, albeit
with considerable hesitations and drawbacks, that the Other is a
necessary component of its „identity“, therefore its future vitali-
ty, its „power“.
I would like to add a third lesson. It cannot be isolated from the
other aspects of European history, but has its own specific impli-
cations. It concerns the possibility of a gradual transformation of
the violence of social antagonisms into collective political capac-
ities by combining the different resources of institutionalizing
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conflicts, setting up public and private instances of social regu-
lation, and progressively introducing new basic rights, which add
new positive „liberties“ or, as Amartya Sen calls them, „capabil-
ities“,11 to the existing rights of the individual, thus becoming an
essential component of citizenship. We might call this lesson
„Machiavelli’s Theorem“, referring to the political model that
can be found in famous pages in his Discorsi sopra la prima deca
di Tito Livio.12
I would admit that globalization has weakened this lesson, or
confronts it with a dilemma, since it places nation-states in a de-
fensive position, restricting their possibilities to mediate social
conflicts and leaving without solution the urgent problem of the
constitution of a new „citizenship“ in Europe. But the fact re-
mains that Europe, in this respect, has a singular, if not privi-
leged, position in the world. Europe certainly has no monopoly
of pluralist representative democracy. But its own history of so-
cial movements has produced a level of institutional recognition
of basic social rights that is still unrivaled in today’s world.
It would seem that this last lesson has to do with an original elab-
oration of conflictual democracy, where different heterogeneous
constitutional principles are combined. This combination in-
cludes a development of legal or formal democracy, making sure
that the individuals who vindicate them are recognized, ultimate-
ly, as the true bearers of rights. It also includes a development of
social or substantial democracy, making sure that inequalities
are addressed and conflictual interests taken into account, so that
individual freedom is not pure and simply equivalent with com-
petition, and competition with an elimination of the weakest
within the „city“. Finally, it refers to an idea of expansive democ-
racy (in the language of Antonio Gramsci) or democratic inven-
tion (in the language of Claude Lefort), which means that politics
remains open to the integration of new elements into the „com-
mon part“ of mankind, and there can be no „end of history“.13
I would not be misunderstood: none of these „lessons“ seems to
me irreversible, valid for ever, or unquestionable. All of them re-
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main clearly fragile and ambiguous. After experiencing extermi-
nation processes on its own soil, Europe believed that it had be-
come the natural champion of international law, which in many
cases it does not obey itself. It has become conscious of the pos-
itive value of the other as such, but it keeps excluding people by
systematically combining criteria of culture (practically equiva-
lent to race) and economic discrimination. The „European“ con-
ception of conflictual democracy that I have described is more a
past ideal than a living reality today: it has a tendency to return
to purely corporatist forms, since economic deregulation and
globalization deprive it of its material possibilities to protect cit-
izens from the brutal variations in the labor market and the con-
tinuous decrease in the level of welfare. However, these deep
contradictions are part of a dynamic whose consequences should
and could be to continue and broaden the European experience
of politics by mobilizing all our forces, be they economic, cultur-
al, intellectual, social, or legal, but also „external“ forces, to
transform international relations. Such a project is not an exer-
cise of power politics; it does not aim at constituting a new
(great) power, but rather at constituting a new type of power, one
that nobody can appropriate. This type of power is essentially a
new correlation among the existing forces; it becomes effective
inasmuch as structures and relations of forces are evolving, and
resistances and alternatives to the dominant tendencies become
more consistent. This explains why I preferred the expression
„anti-strategic politics“. But it is not to say that we can do with-
out initiatives, orientations, and even mottoes. I have no intention
to define a „program“, but I will try to list some priorities, being
aware that they concern long term evolutions, where obstacles
and setbacks and rectifications will inevitably take place.
Collective security: for protection, against fortifications
In order to transform international relations, we need a model of
collective security that can open the possibility of escaping the
confrontation between „terrorist“ and „counter-terrorist“ forces.
But the notion of „collective security“, which is constitutive of
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the texts on which international institutions are based (in partic-
ular the Charter of the United Nations),14 can not remain purely
formal. It cannot simply demand that the use of military force be
subjected to the conditions registered in international law. It must
become (again) a political goal, therefore involve decisions on
certain crucial issues. In my view the demarcation line clearly
passes between a necessity and an impossibility. It is necessary to
take into account the real complexity and deep social roots of the
causes that feed violence and encourage the recourse to terrorist
practices and ideologies everywhere in the world: not only in the
„peripheries“ ridden with poverty, humiliation and corruption,
but also in the „centers“ where inequalities and discriminations
are growing, with probably no less corruption. But it is impossi-
ble to blindly accept violence and terrorism as real answers to ex-
ploitation and domination. This answer is neither legitimate nor
effective; it destroys the very cause in the name of which it is ex-
ercised. Collective security therefore requires us to reject the pro-
jective illusion of transforming the main victims of insecurity in-
to its ultimate authors, but also to leave aside prophetic
discourses picturing „the capitalist system“ as the hidden cause
of every violence and all conflicts, including those which are ob-
stacles to its own development.
What are then the complementary requisites of a viable model of
collective security? It must allow the possibility for both actively
fighting against injustice and having intelligence and police serv-
ices combine their actions under legal control against terrorist
networks, if their existence is proved (which seems to be the case
of Al Qaeda, although the various powers involved clearly don’t
want all its dimensions to be clarified). If we agree that, for var-
ious reasons, there currently is a special threat of „Islamic terror-
ism“, there is no doubt in my mind that the ultimate condition for
an effective „counter-terrorist“ policy is an active commitment to
promoting the emergence of democratic regimes within the Is-
lamic world. Only the ensemble of societies and states where Is-
lam is the essential cultural reference, with the assistance of the
international community, will prove able to „uproot“ Islamic
fundamentalism and terrorism. A model of collective security
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therefore rules out the substitution for joint operations that prove
either too difficult or too embarrassing for the hegemonic power
and its clients, of potentially exterminist and imperialist wars that
serve mainly objectives of regional domination and prestige.
General Disarmament: Who is in Charge?
It is meaningless to talk about collective security if the global
level of armaments is not reduced. International institutions are
not only in charge of negotiating and settling conflicts; they have
been created with a goal of generalizing and controlling the proc-
ess of disarmament. This is the true basis of the idea of „multilat-
eralism“, and it cannot be left aside from the moment when it be-
comes officially a question of obtaining the „disarmament“ of
one or several states whose weapons, quantitatively and qualita-
tively, are dangerous „for the whole of mankind“. By definition
no state („rogue“ or not) can be excepted from this rule, since
precisely the populations of the whole world are likely to become
victims of aggressions or, conversely, of retaliations and preven-
tive wars against particular aggressors. It has been repeatedly
proven that the origin of the proliferation of weapons of mass de-
struction and more generally the constant elevation of the level
of military equipment in the world, has to be traced back to the
great powers themselves, which produce them or develop most
of the corresponding research programs.
The practical consequence is that Europe should not accept the
comparison currently drawn between the „war on terrorism“ and
the war against Nazism, raising once again the specter of „Mu-
nich“ when the idea of disarmament is suggested. It should
refuse NATO plans to start a new cycle of development of its
military capacities. On the contrary it should immediately raise
the question of a long-term reduction in the level of armaments
in the world, concerning both the „new“ and the „old“ concentra-
tions of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons, which include
the European concentrations and exportations, under internation-
al control and inspections.
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There are obvious difficulties with such a perspective, which are
only too likely to lead to its abandonment. It contradicts powerful
private and public interests in the production and consumption of
arms, which continuously increase the level of insecurity
throughout the world, producing a general phenomenon of mili-
tarization of social life, and transforming large regions of the
world into zones of endemic violence and death. This is true
enough; it proves that any serious program of disarmament in-
volves a number of material conditions, including social and po-
litical changes all over the world. This is also the reason why we
should not simply identify disarmament with pacifism. Control-
led disarmament should be compatible with modernized national
or supra-national defense policies, provided only that negotia-
tions take place to replace offensive programs by defensive ones.
Consequently and above all it means that „the world“ agrees to
offer guarantees and means of security to the American people
which, in the long run, would appear better than the prospects of
isolation, fortification, and counter-terror on a world scale. This
may indeed require the experience of tragic events, such as the
attacks on September 11.
Local and Global Processes:
Who Is Accountable, Who Can Mediate?
I am not trying to introduce a new brand of pacifism. I speak of
collective security and advocate, against the current, a new cycle
of general disarmament, but I don’t speak against any interven-
tion in the violent conflicts and civil wars that tend to shape
world politics today: not only humanitarian interventions, but
coercive interventions, making use of the means that derive from
the contemporary intersections of economic, technological, and
cultural processes. Not even military „forces of interposition“
should be excluded as a matter of principle, if the conditions exist
for their introduction. However, Europe might draw another les-
son from its own experience: military conflicts where ethnic, re-
ligious, and cultural communities confront each other, which are
at the same time extremely unequal and mixed with one another,
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can be resolved only locally. Better said, the local and global de-
terminations should invert their roles. The Israeli-Palestinian
conflict is exemplary here. Everybody understands now that the
roots of further hostilities were present in the very terms of the
Oslo Accords and the „peace process“ based on them. But the
Oslo Accords had one important positive aspect: they implied
that, with the help of external mediating forces, the solution
should be found by the conflicting groups themselves. You fre-
quently hear just the opposite nowadays, both in America and in
Europe: that „the Israelis and Palestinians have proved incapable
of discussion.“ The result is a merging of the causes of the con-
flict into elements of a global conflict, producing destructions
and hatreds that become more irreversible every day.
What I tentatively call an „anti-strategy“ therefore also implies
giving a systematic primacy to local determinations over the
„global“ ones, because they refer to the specific historical and
geographical roots of the conflict. But to emphasize the impor-
tance of the local level is not to isolate it: we should neither deny
globalization nor fetishize it as a „destiny“, but rather explore all
the possibilities that it provides in order to set up „multilateral“
interventions which provide the conflicting subjects with observ-
ers, mediators, and witnesses who are themselves accountable, in
order to build a space for coexistence. On the stage of globalized
violence, there are today many actors more or less powerful and
dangerous, but apparently only one „judge“, who is or seems to
be as powerful (and therefore also as dangerous) as all the others
combined. But seen from another angle, this stage also offers
many potential „mediators“: Europe is one of them, albeit not the
only one. It is perhaps no chance if many of them, as Europe it-
self, are trans-national orders, which can be found or will emerge
in a near future in East Asia, in the Cono Sur of Latin America,
in Southern Africa, perhaps even in the Middle East, where a ren-
ovated „Arab League“, both democratized and liberated from the
dream of the „Arab Nation“ could play a decisive role. Maybe we
could say that these potential „mediators“ are the true „anti-sys-
temic forces“ of today and tomorrow, to borrow one of Im-
manuel Wallerstein’s favorite categories.15
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The „Fault Line“ Reduced, or the Euro-Mediterranean
Ensemble
In order to be more precise, I will now make a critical use of the
great debate raised by the publication of Samuel Huntington’s
book The Clash of Civilizations, with its strategic proposal of a
new „world order“ based on the simultaneous acceptance of a
„multicultural world“ and rejection of „multiculturalism“ within
the West, more specifically within America.16 My „anti-strate-
gic“ idea that we ought to push in the direction of the primacy of
local determinations over global determinations within the rela-
tion constitutive of both, in order to promote the „mediated“ res-
olution of conflicts, will remain meaningless unless it proves
possible to define an open, non-exclusive framework that would
nevertheless be sufficiently binding in geographical and histori-
cal terms. In such a framework conflicts would ultimately appear
as „civil wars“, that is, as wars whose very violence and „irrec-
oncilable“ character force the community to assert itself, offering
simultaneous recognition to the conflicting camps, and thus pav-
ing the way for mutual recognition or the building of „civil
peace“. There seems to be an enigma, if not a logical flaw in such
a formulation: which community is able to play such a role. No
preexisting community, based on traditional membership and
„roots“, can play this historic role, but only a community of alli-
ances that is instituted with a view toward favoring this kind of
recognition. Let us note in passing that, to a large extent, this was
precisely the way in which modern nation-states were „invent-
ed“, as a non-existing solution for the problem of religious, feu-
dal, and regional conflicts, but at a different scale and following
procedures that are now obsolete.
I believe that the „Euro-Mediterranean ensemble“, whose devel-
opment is both advocated and constantly hindered by multiple
obstacles, including phobias profoundly buried in the collective
unconscious which trace back to centuries of religious and colo-
nial conflicts, is nevertheless exactly such a framework. Its pro-
gressive construction, through negotiations, common projects,
and simultaneous mediations in the common interest, is itself a
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way to affirm the originality of Europe’s position in international
relations, where the assertion of a specific identity goes hand in
hand with its (seeming) opposite: the inclusion of the Other with-
in itself. This is where Huntington’s conceptualization can give
us a precious inverted indication, since the central notion in his
book is not only the concept of „borderline“ separating heteroge-
neous populations and territories, but more precisely the concept
of a global borderline, which appears as a real „fault line“. It is
along such „fault lines“ that the new (coming) type of wars
would develop. According to Huntington, it is impossible to re-
duce fault lines: you can only „freeze“ the violence they tend to
unleash, and organize the world order around the fragile equilib-
rium of competing, ultimately incompatible civilizations, which
are essentially external to one another. This idea clearly derives
from the geopolitical notions that were theorized around World
War II by the German (pro-Nazi) jurist and philosopher Carl
Schmitt, who explained that every political institution was based
on the absolute primacy of the „friend versus foe“ divide, and
sought to transfer this notion to the new „spatial distribution of
power“ (Nomos der Erde) emerging after the second World
War.17 Clearly, the idea of a „Euro-Mediterranean“ ensemble (or
alliance) expresses the exactly opposite axiom: it does not say
that there are no „fault lines“, no vested hostilities around them,
but it does say that political institutions precisely arise when hos-
tility becomes a focal point for the elaboration of common inter-
ests and historic compromises. Such common interests express
the „complementarity of the enemies“, to borrow an expression
from the French anthropologist Germaine Tillion that I have
commented elsewhere, and this is what makes them politically
significant.18 The whole of the southern shore of the Mediterra-
nean will become progressively involved in the construction of a
common space of interdependence, a laboratory for new relation-
ships between „developed“ and „developing“ countries, and be-
tween cultures that have their religious roots in antithetical ver-
sions of the same monotheistic theology. Provided, of course,
that the political conditions are consciously and tenaciously
forged. If such an ensemble were to gain consistency, it would
become at the same time an instrument to correct inequalities in
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the rates of development, an intermediary structure making it
easier for Europeans to effectively influence world affairs, and a
powerful force for democratizing Arab-Islamic regimes in the
Middle-East. This is the real way to overcome the old patterns of
opposition between „Occidental“ and „Oriental“ cultures. It
seems to me obvious that, in conjunction with other, similar
processes, it could play a very effective role in promoting collec-
tive security and activating the working of international institu-
tions. The alternative is quite gloomy: that the „global“ logic
keeps igniting „fault lines“ for decades ...
These propositions are thrown into current debates as a contribu-
tion coming from an „intellectual“, whose instruments are the
history of ideas and the analysis of discourse. What in a broad
sense could be called „translations“. The intellectual is often per-
ceived as someone who comes always „after the battle“. Let him
take some risks to try and be a little ahead of the events, therefore
also probably off balance. What is certain, however, is if the in-
tellectuals need to keep deserving their name, they should not
plug their ears, and close their lips. As a consequence, as Althus-
ser used to say, they will fall in the trap… Indeed, but this is the
condition for keeping a social function about which many of our
contemporaries now have their doubts.
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